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PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF TEE STUDY 
In Massachusett~as in other states, there is an 
appalling lack of public interest in civil defense. There are 
both those who are just don't care and those who feel that 
civil defense simply cannot work. Divil defense, says the 
latter group, is a highly commendable but totally ~practical 
idea. Of course it is easy to dismiss such an opinion by 
arguing merely that any plan saving just a few lives is better 
than no plan at all. However, a civil defense plan that gains 
the acceptance of only a few is clearly not worth very much in 
operation. To succeed, civil defense must win the confidence 
of the skeptics and arouse interest in the apathetics, an 
extremely fo~idable assignment. 
On the basis of preliminary investigation, I felt 
that the key to a successful civil defense plan, one that 
could gain and hold the interest of the total population, was 
a vigorous and comprehensive public relations program. What 
was needed, I believed, was an active, sweeping program, one 
that was properly timed, stressed all important civil defense 
matters, covered all possible media and encouraged public par-
ticipation. 
In the thesis I have examined the public relations 
policies and activities of Massachusetts civil defense, point-
ing out their merits and weaknesses. Also, I have suggested 
a number of improvements, but, in doing so, have tried to stay 
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within the confines of the present civil defense budget. 
The findings, recommendations and conclusions in this 
study are based primarily on material gathered from personal 
interviews with state and local civil de:f'ense officials and 
public opinion leaders in Massachusetts. Publications of 
various civil defense organizations comprise the bulk of the 
written source material, as there is little critical end up-
to-date written matter on this subject available. 
As civil defense against nuclear attack is a relatively 
new field, there were few established civil defense standards 
with which to for.m a concrete base and departure point for my 
research. Consequently, this is an exploratory study as well 
as a critical work on the public relations aspects of civilian 
defense in Massachusetts. 
This thesis, therefore, is an attempt to find a work-
able program for selling civil defense to the people of 
Massachusetts. More precisely, it is a search for ways to 
present civil defense to the Massachusetts public so as to 
stimulate its interest and gain its confidence. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NEED FOR CIVIL DEFENSE 
When the curtain had fallen on World War II, the 
shining figure of the man in unifor.m quickly faded from the 
public spotlight. And so did his civilian counterpart, the 
air raid warden. To many people peace meant an end to the 
possibility, at least in their lifetime, of the UiJ.ited:: statea 
.becoming the victim of an enemy attack. And it seemed like a 
safe assumption at the time. For we had not only crushed our 
enemies, but also we possessed, in the atomic bomb, an instru-
ment powerful enough to deter any future enemy from aggressive 
acts. 
Consequently, our home defense operations came to an 
abrupt halt. Blackouts ended. Families converted their home 
shelters to serve more useful purposes. Air raid wardens 
discarded their helmets and whistles. In short, all plans and 
activities for home defense were quickly scrapped. 
Although to most Americans the danger seemed clearly 
over, a new and potentially greater danger was quietly but 
rapidly germinating. While most of us were still tasting 
victory, scientists of several nations, including the United 
States, were busy developing weapons with unbelievable 
destructive power. At the same time, others were devising 
the means of projecting these weapons greet distances with 
deadly accuracy. 
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The swift pace of nuclear research after World War 
II, and the concurrent rise of the cold war eventually moved 
us to realize that the political honeymoon was over. The 
communist infiltration in Europe and the Far East, the Berlin 
blockade, the UN vetoes, the frenzied arms race and, finally 
the Korean War all served as grave warnings of what the future 
might bring to our own country, especially if we were unpre-
pared. Our objective was quite clear: build our home defenses 
strong enough to protect ourselves from possible enemy attack. 
However, the means of achieving the objective were not so 
obvious. Civilian defense was no longer a mere matter of 
recruiting block wardens . and designating certain area for 
shelter against the blasts and fires caused by enemy bombs. 
For the development of nuclear weapons created new and complex 
problems for civilian defense. Now we had to cope with weapons 
of unprecedented power: it is estimated, for example, that an 
airplane carrying just an average load of small atomic weapons 
could effect as much destruction as a thouss.nd airplanes using 
conventional World War II bombs.l The blast force alone of a 
nuclear weapon is enough to level a wide area, and if the 
resultant fires go uncontrolled, there can be tremendous 
damage.2 
1. Facts About the H-Bomb, Federal Civil Defense Adminis-
tration, u.s. GOvernment Printing Office, 1955. 
2. There are practical limits to the amount of dama ge one 
bomb can do, according to scientists. See page 64. 
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But blast and fire are not the only products of 
nuclear explosions. There is also radiation. Although radio-
activity is nothing new and is actually found everywhere in 
small amounts, its presence in large doses near hWftan beings 
is highly dangerous. Nuclear explosions produce radioactive 
particles, called "fallout". The ne. ture and extent of the 
fallout depends on many factors, including the nearness of 
the bomb blast to the earth (the closer to the earth, the 
greater the fallout), the direction and speed of the winds, 
3 
and other atmospheric conditions. Heavy concentrations of 
fallout will contaminate an area and will likely kill all 
those within it who are unprepared. Direct exposure of the 
skin to radioactivity is the contact most likely to prove 
fatal, but breathing radioactive dust or eating or drinking 
contaminated food or water may also cause serious illnes s or 
4 
deeth. 
The discovery of nuclear power itself however, was 
not our sole basis for concern. It was the enormous advance-
menta in long-range striking power which transformed nuclear 
power from a laboratory wonder to a potential killer. 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are evidence of what nuclear bombs 
could do in 1945. Now, more than a decade later, we have 
far greater nuclear power capable of being delivered anywhere 
on earth in greater quantities with greater speed than ever 
3. Radioactive Fallout, Federal Civil Defense Admin-
istration, u.s. Government Printing Office, 1956, 
pp. 14-17. 
4• Ibid., P• 14. 
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before. With the development of jet bombers able to outrace 
the speed of sound and fly many hours without refueling, we 
can no more ready only our coastal cities for defense against 
enemy attack as we did during World War II. Now all sections 
of the country are vulnerable. We need not strain the imagin-
ation to realize that a multi-pro.nged attacked delivering 
large numbers of nuclear bombs to all our major cities could 
cripple the country in one blow. 
The threat which we now face grows more intense with 
time. The United States, Russia, and other world powers are 
not stopping at the point they have now reached. They are 
continuing to conduct extensive nuclear research and expand 
facilities for the production of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, 
the military powers are stockpiling large amounts of nuclear 
weapons for possible use in war. They are also enlarging their 
air forces, and developing other means of delivering nuclear 
weapons such as atomic-powered submarines and guided missiles. 
In the light of all these postwar achievements in the 
creation and production of new devices of war, we have dras-
tically reoriented our thinking and redesigned our obsolete 
plans for a very much neglected civilian defense. To survive 
a nuclear attack, concluded federal defense experts, we needed 
better protection than a system of shelters could provide. 
Public and private shelters, they felt, would give adequate 
protection to those outside the effective ra.nge of a bomb 
blast. But within a target area, most likely a thickly 
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populated section, the experts held it would be folly to rely 
solely on shelters. They pointed out that prohibitive cost 
and scarcity of space would preclude the construction of a 
network of ideally located shelters sufficient in number, 
large enough and strong enough to guard a densely settled 
area against a nuclear attack. What was needed, thought 
defense authorities, was a plan for evacuating the populace 
of a crowded area before an attack had taken place. The idea 
was to warn the residents of a target area as long before an 
attack as possible and lead the.m out of the area along des~g­
nated evacuation routes to specific reception zones. In 
their new locations the evacuees would be provided with temp-
orary shelter, sufficient food and clothing, and whatever 
medical or other services that might be required. 
To execute such a tremendous project simultaneously 
in many target areas throughout the country, together with 
the other essential civilian defense tasks, we need a wealth 
of manpower aid equipment. There is a multitude of services 
vital to a complete and effective civilian defense operation: 
warden; fire; police; . health; welfare; rescue; engineering; 
communications; transportation; and staff. Thousands of 
trained persons are needed to man these services. 
The recruitment of personnel and the appropriation 
of equipment are not enough to make civilian defense work. 
Indispensable is a well-managed organization at each level 
of government to formulate detailed policies, plan and 
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coordinate the activities of the various services, and train 
and educate the public, as well as its own members, in civil-
ian defense procedures. In general,- an official civilian 
defense organization would give direction and substance to 
the new and untested civilian defense concepts, policies and 
techniques. Endeavoring to fill the need for organization, 
Congress in 1950, after a careful study of the problem, passed 
the Federal Civil 'Defense Act which became effective in 
January, 1951. 
CHAPl'ER III 
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE PROMOTION 
The Federal Civil Derense ·Administration 
The Federal Civil Derense Act or 1950 established a 
Federal Civil Derense Administration in the executive branch 
or the government "to provide a plan or civil derense ror the 
protection or lire and property" from enemy attack. A Federal 
Civil Defense Administrator, appointed by the President, was 
to take charge or the organization or all civil defense affairs. 
The primary runction of the new federal body was not to dictate 
iron-clad policy to be followed to the letter by subordinate 
civil defense agencies. On the contrary, the rederal act 
vested primary responsibility for the operation of civilian 
defense in the states and their political subdivisions. The 
federal government was to provide coordination and guidance. 
This did not mean, ho~ever, that the rederal organization 
should merely serve as an approval board, giving occasional 
advice. The intent or the act was that the federal civil 
defense body should map out general plans for the execution 
of every phase of the civilian defense operation so that the 
various state and local civil defense agencies would have 
workable guidesheets ror their own individual operations. 
Wherever and whenver the rederal plans were unsuitable, the 
state and local agencies could adjust them as they wished. 
In any case, the state and local agencies were to work out 
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the details of the civil defense plan. Each state and local 
area had its own geographical and other problems which it 
alone could solve. 
The planning of the Federal Civil Defense Administra-
tion in the years since its creation has been based primarily 
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on the following assumptions : 
1) The Soviet Union is capable of striking any target 
in the u.s. 
2) If US is attacked, the principal weapons will be 
nuclear bombs of varying size delivered by aircraft or sub-
marine. 
3) The enemy will also use incendiary, and chemical 
warfare weapons, bi~logical warfare, psychological warfare 
and sabotage. 
4) Initial attack will be attempted knockout blow to 
be .followed by other attacks,· and majority o.f weapons will 
be delivered on target. 
5) Primary targets will be heavily populated and 
industrial areas and bases of military retaliation. 
6) Major target areas will be warned about one hour 
be.fore attack. 
Proceeding upon these assumptions the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration has set out to establish a well-inte-
grated, efficient, nationwide civilian defense machine. The 
.first step was the promotion of organizations at the state 
level. 
5. 1955 Annual Report, Federal Civil Defense Administration, 
u. s. Government Printing Office, 1956, Pages 1-5. 
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The Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency 
In;. some cases, the state goverrnnents needed little 
prodding from Washington to create their own civil defense 
organizations. Massachusetts was one of these states. In 
1950, following the passage of the federal act, Massachusetts 
approved a civil defense bill creating a state civilian 
defense agency headed by a civilian defense director appointed 
by the governor, with the advice and consent of the council, 
to serve during the governor's pleasure. The agency was to 
plan the general state civilian defense operation, direct 
the training of personnel, conduct practice exercises and 
assist other civilian defense agencies and the various state 
departments in planning and preparing civilian defense meas-
ures. The state agency, then, was to coordinate and guide 
all state activities. From the start it was clear that the 
state agency would have to carry more than its share of the 
burden until such time as the various local areas could build 
their ow.n organizations. With 351 cities and towns in the 
state it was obvious that it would be several years before 
all communities would be able to assume their full load. 
Under the Federal Civil Defense Act the federal gov-
ernment makes contributions to the states for certain approved 
materials and equipment. The states, in turn, may pass these 
funds on to the local unit. The federal act provides for the 
allocation of specified amounts to each state against which 
proj~ct applications are submitted. Funds not needed by 
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states are distributed to states which do need them. Each 
state must match the feaeral funds it receives on a 50-50 
basis. By mid-1956 Massachusetts had received over $2 million 
of the $55 million allocated to the states since the inception 
of the civilian defense program. The bulk of the $2 million 
was spent on materials and equipment for the medical, commun-
ications, fire, attack warning, training and education, and 
rescue services. However, the federal government will not 
help pay for any personnel or administrative expense. The 
states must bear this cost. Consequently, the states pay 
their own, state-level personnel and administrative expenses 
only. Each local unit must bear its entire administrative 
costs and any compensation going to its personnel must come 
from its own treasury~ And, any funds given by the state to 
local units for materials or equipment must be matehed on a 
50-50 basis by the local units. 
Progress in Massachusetts civil defense during the 
first few years following passage of the state act was 
necessarily slow, and uneven throughout the state. In some 
local areas where interest in civilian defense ran high, active 
and efficient organizations sprang up quickly. However, such 
was the exception. In most areas the public was totally 
unenthusiastic. 
Aside from the mixed reaction within the state, the 
state agency had to move slowly and cautiously so as not to 
outstrip the sluggis·h pace of the federal program. Civil 
Defense, from its inception, had been a prime subject of 
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conflicting opinion among and between Congressmen and leaders 
of the executive branch. As a result, the federal program 
suffered from constant threats of drastic changes in aims 
and policies. Being dependent on the federal government for 
much of its funds and for other services, Massachusetts, like 
other states, had to proceed according to the federal plan. 
Reorganization 
After several years of orientation and experimenta-
tion, Massachusetts in 1955 reorganized its civil defense 
system, both on an administrative and a geographical basis. 
The reorganization was necessitated by extreme changes in 
the nature of the civil defense problem since its inaugura-
tion, and by experience with the Massachusetts Agency as 
originally organized, The governor, exercising his authority 
to organize, in detail, the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, 
carried out the reorganization through a series of Executive 
and Administrative Orders. 
The administrative reorganization had as its objec-
tive the strengthening of the state civilian defense system 
through the delegation of more supervisory authority to the 
state agency and the institution of a more clear-cut and 
equitable division of responsibilities between state and 
local directors and other government agencies. During the 
formative years of Massachusetts Civilian defense, the state 
agency had been saddled with the responsibility for the 
various civilian defense services. Unfortunately the state 
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agency did not have these services at its command. It had to 
seek out individually the cooperation and assistance of the 
state departments in charge of these services. This meant for 
a makeshift coordination of services. at best. To solve the 
problem, the otmr government agencies had to assume their 
share of civil defense responsibilities. And, to assure co-
ordination, the services had to be combined in a::> me way under 
the supervision of the state agency. Under the new plan, each '): 
state department, independent division, board. commission and 
independent institution was to make suitable plans for the 
protection of its own personnel, supplies and equipment in 
case of attack, and for the continuation of such part of its 
normal services or the carrying out of such special services 
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as the governor or civil defense director may request. In 
addition certain departments were made responsible for a par-
ticular civil defense service and were to assign one or mare 
persons to the state civil defense headquarters under the 
direction and control of the state civil defense director, 
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as the staff of the assigned service. The responsibility 
was to include the assignment of resources in t he training 
of the functions of the service in time of disaster. Another 
6. Or~anization Plan, Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, 
19 5. PP• 29-30. 
Ibid. The departments named and their services 
Department of Commerce - Facilities Service 
" " Education - Education " 
" " Labor and 
Industries - Manpower " 
It 
" Public Health - Medical " 
were: 
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Executive Order called for local civilian defense organizations 
also to provide for all the necessary services. 
A further reorganization move gave state and local 
directors increased power. The state director was handed 
sweeping authority in issuing regulations, controlling 
' 
civilian defense resources and procuring property during an 
8 
emergency proclaimed by the governor. The local units were 
also empowered, in the event of emergency, to take possession 
of all real and personal property deemed essential in combat-
9 
ting the effects of an attack. 
The new civilian defense plan, in addition, trans-
ferred responsibility for the organization and administration 
of the Ground Observer Corps from the Air Force to the Direc-
tor of Civilian Defense. The Corps, however, was still to 
operate in conf'ormity with the rules and regulations of the 
Air Force. 
The principal effect of the administrative reorgan-
ization has been the help it has rendered the state agency. 
By placing the various services under the supervision of the 
state agency and by more clearly defining responsibilities 
and powers at the state level, it has enabled the state agency 







8 • Ibid., 
9. Ibid 
of Bublic Safety- Police Service 
11 (Division of Sta~e Police) " 
" Public Safety - Fire " (Division of Fire Prevention) 
" Public Utilities - Utilities " 
"Public!Welfare -Welfare " 
"Public.Works- Engineering " 
" P~blic Health - Water 11 {Division of Sanitary Engineering) 
pp. 33-36. 
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increased efficiency and certainty. 
The geographical reorganization was a reconstruction 
of the field organization of the Massachusetts Civil Defense 
Agency.lO The various field units were rearranged into a 
more workable system. The field organization was now to be 
based upon the geographical division of the Collliilonwealth into 
four "Areas" and the subdivision of the Areas into Twenty 
"Sectors". Each of the Areas and Sectors, with the exception 
of two Sectors which coincide with the cities of Boston and 
Worcester, has its own organization with a director appointed 
by the state director. The chain of command passes from the 
State Agency through the Area to the Sector down to the city 
or town. The critical target ·areas of Boa ton, Springfield 
and Worcester are the centers of three of the Areas, with the 
fourth centered in the Fall River-New Bedford section which is 
close to the critical target, Providence, Rhode Island. 
w,.S 
Another geographical division ~ the zoning system. 
There are three types of zones within the state: the evac-
uation zone, the neutral zone, and the reception zone. The 
evacuation zones are the critical target areas and surround-
ing territory. The neutral zones are further away from the 
critical targets, and the reception zones still further. 
The theoryufs that our radar network together with our Ground 
wouLd 
Observer Corps ~ furnish advance warning of enamy attack. 
urdULJ... 
Warning ~rl come about an hour prior to attack. When the 
10. Ibid., PP• 31-33• 
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alert~s sounded, all radio and TV stations will go off the 
w~>\,)LA 
air. Some AM radio stations~ then return to the air, 
switching to the frequencies of 64 0 and 1240, called the 
Conelrad frequencies, and broadcast information and instruc-
tions on evacuation and other matters. 
l,l)oU-ul 
Those in the evacuation zones ~1 move through the 
neutral zone to safety in the reception zone. This zone 
1fl\).e.. 
designation thus ~s the people in each section an advance 
woU-Ld 
picture of what action they~l likely have to take and the 
\.l)~ 
duties they ~1 probably have to perform in case of an 
attack. 
Natural Disaster Responsibility 
In addition to the state administrative and gao-
. ~ 
graphical reorganization, other changes have occurred in the 
Massachusetts civilian defense system since its inauguration. 
In January 1953 the President acting under Congressional 
authority issued an executive order making the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration the chief coordinating body in the ad-
ministration of natural disaster relief. Under this new pro-
cedure, when the governor of a state applie~ fo r disaster 
assistance and the President declare~ a major d i saster in 
that state, the FCDAwts to coordinate all federal activities 
and direct the disbursement of federal funds allocated for 
the disaster area ?! 
The FCDA ha4 recommended that state civil defense 
11. 1955 Annual Report, Federal Civil Defense Administra-
tion, op. cit., p. 39. 
18 
agencies be given authority to coordinate state natural 
disaster activities. Massachusetts, along with many other 
states, has complied, and now includes natural disaster relief 
in its civil defense planning. In 1955 the state agency was 
in actual operation in the natural disaster field. The 
agency coordinated state activities and the administration 
of federal and state funds in the areas stricken by a hurri-
cane and floods. The state agency here passed a severe test, 
as the areas hit hardest were both densely populated and 
heavily industrialized, thus creating a network of problems, 
including restoring power, communications and transportation, 
and caring for thousands of homeless persons. 
~resent State Organization 
As it now stands, under the director, Major General 
John J. Maginnis, and the deputy director, George A. Burrows, 
12 
the state agency has six chiefs of staff, or staff officers, 
13 
twenty chiefs of service, and two Ground Observer Corps 
Officers all located at state headquarters in Natick. Also 
under the director are the field officers - the four area 
directors end the 18 sector directors - and the director and 
12. The staff sections are: Administration, Lega~, 
Operations, Plans, Public Information and Supply. 
13. The services ere: Communications, Education, Engin-
eering, Facilities, Field Administration, Fire, Man-
power, Matching Funds, Medical, Police, Raidac, 
Rescue, Special Projects, Training, Transportation, 
Utilities, Warden, Water, Welfare and Women's 
Activities. 
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superintendent of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Training 
Center at Topsfield. 
In the first chapter we briefly traced the postwar 
developments which have created the need for a new civilian 
defense ~ystem. In this chapter we reviewed the efforts of 
the legislative and executive branches of the federal and 
Massachusetts governments to build civilian defense organiza-
tions. In the next chapter we shall discuss the vital role 
which public relations can and must assume in order for the 
Massachusetts civilian defense organizations to achieve their 
desired ends. 
CH.Jl.PTER IV 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 
IN CIVIL DEFENSE 
A civil defense organization is unique among govern-
ment bodies in that its plans, operations and apparatus are 
designed to benefit the entire population within its geogra-
phical area of control, but not until some undetermined date 
in the future, if at all. It is one government unit which 
functions with the hope that its services will never be needed. 
The general public, of course, feels the same way. Unfortun-
ately, there is always a possibility, however slim it may be, 
that disaster will strike and the civil defense organization 
will become our most important unit of government. But, for 
several reasons to be discussed more fully in chapter six, 
the majority of people in Massachusetts, like most of those 
in other states, are just not interested in the possibilities 
of nuclear attack or in civilian defense efforts to ready us 
in case it does come. Considering the prominent part civil 
defense will play in case of disasters, the top-priority 
power it will have, and the vast job it must perform, it is 
most disturbing to know that public interest in Massachusetts 
civil defense affairs almost defies detection. 
Since the primary purpose of civil defense is to min-
imize the effects of a disaster on persons and property, it 
follows that without the driving force of public interest 
21 
all the equipment and personnel now available to civil defense 
are just so much wasted resources. If all the people are to 
profit from the resources of civil defense, they must know 
where to find them, how to use them and have confidence in 
them. Once a high level of public interest is attained it 
would be no problem to meet the quota of active yoibb.n'b:eers 
needed to serve actively in the civil defense organization. 
But, there is a huge contrast between setting such a goal and 
reaching it. To reach it, the only sensible solution is a 
vigorous public relations program. 
To construct a sound public relations program for a 
civil defense organization or any other body, the present pro-
gram should first be analyzed, the good points pointed up and 
..... 
the bad points ~ooted out, and then workable changes or addi-
tions should be recommended. Proceeding in thi_s manner, the 
author~ conducted a survey of Massa~husetts civil defense 
directors and public opinion leaders to secure facts and 
opinion5to serve as the basis for an analysis of the current 
public relations program. Before embarking on the survey, 
however, the author conducted a preliminary or "test" survey 
in order to gather data for the construction of meaningful 
questions for the final survey. 
The preliminary investigation was a series of depth 
interviews with state and local civil defense directors. All 
those interviewed in this survey were located in the metro-
politan Boston area. The aim here, of course, was not to 
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obtain any statistical conclusions for the state, but rather 
to find what some of the directors were doing public relations-
wise, what opinions they held on various civil defense topics 
and what the nature of their relationship was with other civil 
defense organizations. The preliminary survey enabled the 
author to eliminate certain topics and questions which were 
unimportant and add significant ones not previously included. 
The findings of the preliminary survey, although 
highly enlightening, were scarcely encouraging. They revealed, 
among other things, that making civil defense click in 
Massachusetts is now and will be an enor.mous undertaking. 
The picture at the moment is extremely scrambled with few 
people agreed on how to unscramble it. On one side is the 
~ajority of the public either totally disinterested in civil 
defense or else scoffing at it as an admirable but impractical 
idea. On the other is the civil defense management, unsure 
as to what course official policy will take next, and just as 
uncertain a.s to how to stimulate public enthusiasm once the 
official line has been set. Even worse, disagreement on what 
to do with the people once it has captured their interest. 
Several of the directors interviewed in the initial survey 
had no plan of any sort for stirring the public. To them 
mass evacuation is a preposterous plan, and but for the 
small monetary or political return attendant to their jobs, 
they would prefer that no one attacks us~ 
The preliminary survey divulged an urunistak&:ble lack 
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of creative drive among civil defense directors at the local 
level. Few are planning community-wide programs to arouse 
local interest in civil defense. Many are inclined to allow 
their offices to become mere distribution points for reams of 
printed matter published by the Federal Civil Defense Admin-
istration. The directors• answers to why there has been so 
little local promotion range from incorrigible public apathy 
to the inadequate guidance of the state agency. 
On the basis of the findings in the first survey, it 
was evident that the only way to gain and hold public inter-
est, the key to an active civil defense system, is to motivate 
the people by bringing civil defense into their own immediate 
environment. The combination of this idea with the results 
of the test survey led the author to the conclusion that a 
successful public relations program must be: comprehensive; 
have a wide media coverage; actively seek public participa-
tion; and be well-timed. These criteria were all employed in 
the appraisal of existing civil defense programs in the final 
survey. Here is a brief explanation of the criteria: 
Comprehensiveness - the inclusion and proper emphasis of all 
important civil defens& topics in the public relations program. 
For example, the civil defense role in natural disaster as 
well as that during enemy-caused disaster should be stressed. 
Coverage - the dissemination of information both over a wide 
range of media, in order to reach all the people, and often 
enough in order to keep them constantly aware of civil 
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defense matters. The choice of media should vary according 
to the size and location of a civil defense unit. Thus, the 
state or large city should concentrate on mass media ~· covering 
wide areas, while a small town should employ media which 
capitalize on the ease of quickly reaching most groups and 
individuals in the town on a personal basis. 
Public Participation - the active recruitment of volunteers 
for civil defense work on a permanent basis and the assign-
ment of specific duties to them on a continuing basis. It is 
important the t civil defense workers a.re kept busy, or their 
interest will quickly fade. Periodic participation of the 
general public on a small scale, as in a practice alert or 
civil defense week, is also desirable. 
Timing - the carrying out of public relations activities at 
the proper time. When feasible, public relations moves should 
be made with regard for both the news of the moment and the 
time of the year. To illustrate, a practice alert held in 
Boston on a weekend in the middle of the summer would hardly 
be worthwhile, as at that time great numbers of Bostonians 
are at Cape Cod, in New Hampshire or ~-Gsewhere. An alert in 
the late spring or early fall when the weather is good and 
few have left the city would be preferable. As a further 
example, an article on civilian defense, not requiring 
immediate publication to be newsworthy, issued to the press 
at an ordinary time might attract a few readers, but one 
released during a time of international crisis, when war 
threatens us, would tie-in with what people are currently 
reading, and probably attract many. 
25 
Of course the establishment of a public relations pro-
gram utilizing the above criteria at the state and local level 
presupposes the willingness and desire of the various civil 
defense directors to undertake it. There are no short-cuts; 
time and effort must be expended in order to launch the pro-
gram, not to mention keeping it moving. It would be naive 
to believe that more than a scattered few of the directors 
could be driven to act either by presenting the plan in logi-
cal terms, appealing to their sense of duty and patriotism 
or by any similar means. Talk alone will not do it, but 
certain concrete rr.easures can be taken to provide the neces-
sary incentive. We shall discuss these in later chapters. 
CHAPTER V 
THE PUBLIC RELATIONS STRUCTURE OF 
~~SSACHUSETTS CIVIL DEFENSE 
Public relations in any organization is, to some 
degree, every man 1 s job. The words and actions of each indi-
vidual tend to cast reflections, good or bad, and of varying 
intensity, on the organization with which he is associated. 
This is especially true in the case of an organization like 
civil defense, which is in the process of trying both to 
justify its existence as a tax-sustained body, and to win 
active public support for its continued development. 
The director, the deputy director and staff officers 
of the state agency, for example, are constant public re~­
tions representatives of civil defense in the state, fre-
quently making speeches before business, social, fraternal 
and other groups, and attending national, regional and state 
meetings. 
The official public relations chief for civil defense 
in Massachusetts is currently Lt. Colonel John J. Devlin of 
the state agency. His title, as is customary in government 
agencies, is "Public Information Officer." Lt. Colonel 
Devlin is the acting director, serving temporarily until a 
permanent replacement is found for Mr. Schuyler Van Ness 
who died in December, 1956. The PIO is one of the six full-
time paid staff officers who are, as noted earlier, subordinate 
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only to the director and deputy director. The PIO's assigned 
functions are as follows: 
1. Advising the director and staff on all aspects 
of public relations. 
2. Coordinating all civil defense public information 
within the state. 
3. Disseminating civil defense information to appro-
priate information media. 
4. Planning public relations programs to gain and 
maintain public goodwill, understanding and support. 
5. Observing and analyzing public opinion trends and 
reporting them to the director. 
6. Reviewing material concerning the state agency 
for release to the various media. 
7. Conducting a speaker's bureau. 
Carrying out the above functions effectively is a 
. 
massive taks, certainly a job for more than one man. However, 
the Public Info:rmation Officer does almost all this work alone, 
save for the occasional help of one of the other overburdened 
staff officers. The PIO does not even have the use of a 
full-time typist. He must share the services of a clerk-
typist with several other officers. 
With so much to do with so little assistance, the PIO 
simply does not have the time to meet all the demands of his 
job. The bulk of his time is consumed in writing, reviewing 
and disseminating material to the various media. He also 
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maintains a rather sketchy speaker's timetable, which is an 
informal list of the times when a member of the agency makes 
a speech before a public or private group. The director and 
the several staff officers speak quite frequently at the invi-
tation of various organizations. However, the Agency does 
not have the personnel at hand to maintain a formal speakers' 
(;, 
bureau for arranging dates, selecting subjts and speakers, 
" writing the speeches and providing visual-aid materials. 
When a speaker is requested, the PIO asks for a volunteer 
from among the handful available for speech-making. The one 
who does volunteer must handle all speech preparations himself. 
As for intra-organization activities, the agency pub-
lishes a. monthly, mimeographed "house organ," called uThe Civil 
Defense News," w&ichd isyd1serf5u~e~t tb~ alili state and local 
civil defense officials. Edited by the PIO, it is an inform-
ative, well-written publication, remarkably free of the 
stilted language characteristic of government literature. 
Averaging about ten pages in length, it contains news of 
both state and local happenings. The publication has proved 
very helpful in promoting the exchange of ideas and informa-
tion between the state agency and the more active local units. 
The competitive slant given it, by listing every month the 
names of communities successfully completing certain civil 
defense tasks and those who have not, has, according to state 
officials, tended to speed up local progress. 
In addition to the lack of staff or clerical help, the 
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PIO has been handicapped in the performance of his job by 
the poor civil defense organization at the local level. The 
PIO is responsible for the planning of all statewide civil 
defense programs. But few local units have the organization 
to put them into operation. The PIO is also responsible for 
coordinating all local civil defense public information. 
However, there is very little to coordinate. 
To examine .local organization for a moment, of the 
351 cities and towns in the Commonwealth, only a handful 
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have public information officers, most of whom are part-
time, unpaid volunteers. In fact, in only nine communities 
in the state is the director a full-time, paid official. In 
a few others, the director is pert-time and paid. However, 
in over 90% of the communities the director is part-time and 
unpaid. 
In most local units, the director himself also carries 
out the public relations.functions, if there are any. In 
many, he is the entire civil defense staff, with perhaps a 
part-time typist to assist him. Where the director is 
solely in charge of every civil defense operation, public 
relations necessarily receives little attention. 
The state PIO faces obstacles not only in trying to 
marshal adequate, positive public relations support at the 
local level, but also in trying to maintain a constant 
14. The state PIO estimated at the end of 1956 that 
there were no more than 25 local PIO's in the state. 
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working relationship with the local organizations. Turnover 
among local directors has been heavy, and keeping an up-to-
date list of the many directors in the state is a job in 
itself. 
The public relations policies of the state agency 
can realize full effectiveness only when the local organiza-
tions are public relations conscious. In all phases of 
civil def~nse the local unit is the vital link between the 
state organization and the people of its community. Without 
question the state agency must enlarge its public information 
staff and increase its state-level activities. But its pri-
mary attention should be devoted to stimulating promotional 
work in the local organizations. 
In this chapter we have glanced at the public rela-
tiona structure within the Massachusetts civil defense system. 
We have also learned something about the efforts and problems 
of the state public information officer in the public relations 
field. In the next chapter we shall scrutinize the policies 
and activities of local organizations within the state in 
selling civil defense to the public. 
CHAPTER VI 
PUBLIC RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
As the local organization is the primary civil derense 
contact with the public, the author relt a survey of the public 
relations structure, policies, and activities of the local 
units would reveal most clearly some of the basic problems con-
fronting civil defense in Massachusetts and in so doing would 
help suggest workable improvements. The method of investiga-
tion chosen was a series of depth interviews with a number of 
local civil defense directors in the state. At the same time 
depth interviews were conducted with selected newspaper edi-
tors and television and radio public affairs editors in order 
to glean some facts and views from opinion-molders completely 
outside the civil defense structure. 
Selection of Interview Subjects 
The local directors were selected so as to represent 
communities of all sizes and the various parts of the state. 
Thus stratification was necessary. The 351 cities and towns 
were first broken down into three groups according to popula-
tion, as follows: 
Population 
40,000 and over 










As noted above, seven subjects were chosen from each 
of the three population strata. However, each group of seven 
subjects was selected proportionately from the two area>or 
locs.tion groups. The sample, then, was drawn at random accord-
ing to the following table: 
Local Directors in: 
Size of Connnunit;r Areas 1 and 2 Areas 3 and 
40,000 and over 5 2 
10,000 to 39,000 5 2 
Under 10,000 
...l l! 
Totals ••• 13 8 
Ten newspapers editors and five radio and TV editors 
were chosen at random from the twenty-one communities whose 
local directors were interviewed. 
Interview Method 
!1 
The procedure was to ask both a series of factual ques-
tions and a set of opinion questions, all drawn from a schedule 
prepared on the basis of data collected in the prelindnary sur-
vey discussed in Chapter IV. As each question was answered, 
further questions were asked to learn the reasons behind the 
answers. The local directors were asked a comprehensive series 
of questions. The newspaper and radio and TV editors were 
asked a much smaller number. 
The Findings 
e. 
All the intervieweJfs were first asked, in order to gain 
an insight into their outlook toward civil defense in general, 
two broad questions~ The first was: nWhat factors, in order of 
importance, are hindering the progress of civil defense in this 
country?n As, expected, the 21 directors, the ten ne>vspaDermen, 
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the 5 radio and TV editors and 5 state officials named publ ic apathy 
as the number one obstacle. 24 ranked the shelter-evacuation dispute 
(whether shelter or evacuation is the best protection against nuclear 
attack) as second in importance. Of t he other 17, ll thought public 
apathy tobe the only important factor, and theref ore had no second 
choice, while 6, all civil defense officials, named the lack of funds 
for civil lllefense use as next most significant. 
The second of the broad questions, which obviously hinged upon 
the first, . was: "What is t he main reason for the present public apathy 
toward civil defense? 11 17 said the main reason is t hat the country is 
now at peace, that during peacetime few worry about enemy attack. 14 
attributed the apathy to a general belief that it is useless to try to 
defend against the H-bomb, that no known plan of defense is adequate. 
6 claimed the reason is that the public does not truly feel we .vill ever 
be attacked. 4 thought the answer to be the lack of promotional work. 
It is eviqent, , on the basis of these findings, that a sound public relations 
job is needed to arouse the public from its peacetime lethargy, to 
convince the people that an H-bomb attack can occur, but also to inform 
them of the various pr actical limitations of nuclear weapons and t he 
carefully planned methods of defending against them. 
The chief purpose of the survey at t he local level was to determine 
the nature and extent of publ ic relations programs in local civil def ense. 
'l'he programs were examined in 
34 
terms of comprehensiveness, coverage, public participation 
and timing. 
A. Comprehensiveness 
There are many elements which combine to make up a 
civil defense system. And, for the system to be effective, the 
total population must know, for example, what warnings will be 
issued in case of enemy attack, and whether a particular warn-
ing means "take CO"!!'.er" or "evacuate." Furthermore, in the 
event of a take-.cover signal, they must know how to shelter 
themselves properly. Similarly, in case of an evacuation 
signal, they must know how to evacuate, by what route, and 
their destination. 
To instill in people's minds a working knowledge of 
these and other civil defense procedures is not a simple 
matter of barking instructions to them just before a disaster 
hits. On the contrary, it is a complex process of continu-
ously informing, educating and training the people over an 
indefinite period of time. In the event of disaster, some 
degree of panic and disorder is inevitable. It is the job 
of civil defense to minimize the presence of these factors. 
The best way to accomplish this is to see that the people 
become so thoroughly imbued with the civil defense plan of 
action, that, if an emergency occurs, they will adopt it 
instinctively. In time of disaster people will require some 
on-the-spot information and instructions, but these should 
merely provide guidance in the application of the "basics" 
they have already learned. 
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In an initial step toward creating a civil defense 
consciousness in the public. The federal government has 
published and distributed to the states volumes of written 
~atter on various civil defense subjects. The FCDA has recom-
mended to the states that two items in particular be distributed 
to every household. Together thew contain the essence of civil 
defense planning. One is an air raid alert card which lists 
and explains the various warning signals. The other is a book-
let entitled "Home Protection Exercises." 
The MCDA announced to all local directors in early 1956 
tba t these two infonnation pieces were available in sufficient 
quantity and advised immediate distribution. In the survey 
conducted roughly a year later the twenty-one directors were 
checked on their distribution by the following questions with 
indicated results: 
Have you completed distribution of the air raid alert 
cards in your community? 
- Size of Community -
40,000 10,000 Under 
and over to ~9a922 10 1 000 Totals 
Yes 5 3 3 11 
No, but has begun 
distribution 2 1 1 4 No, has not begun 
distribution 3 3 6 
Have you completed distribution of the booklet, "Home 
Protection Exercises" in your community? 
Yes 
No, but has 
begun dis-
tribution 























As the results show, in approximately a year's time only 
slightly more than half of the directors interviewed had com-
pleted distribution of the air raid alert cards, and less than 
a third had finished handing out the booklets. As these items 
needed no revision at the local level, all a director had to 
do was distribute them. That in a whole year so few completed 
such an important, yet easy, job is evidence of the state of 
lethargy at the local level. The MCDA has maintained a list 
of the names of communities reporting completion of the air 
/ .. ,-
raid card distribution, and publishe~ periodically in the 
"Civil Defense News," along with a list of those who have not 
finished the job. State officials feel this has been an effec-
tive spur to local action as the cards have reached homes 
faster and in greater numbers than any other item. The 
February 1957 is sue of uThe News" says that less than one-
third of all communities have failed to report complete dis-
tribution. But reporting and doing are two distinct accomp-
lishments. Three of the directors who reported the job com-
pleted to the MCDA admitted in the survey that they had not 
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dispensed a card. The six failing to begin distribution split 
their reasons evenly between the lack of help available and 
the belief that the cards would only go the way of all pro-
motional literature. The argument that it is difficult to 
secure help to distribute material is a poor one. As the sur-
vey results show, the directors in the largest communities 
have the best record of distribution although they have the 
most people to reach. For the director ambitious enough to 
seek cooperation and assistance actively, there are numerous 
organizations and groups possessing the means for accomplish-
ing the job. Among those used successfully by local directors 
in the state are: Boy Scouts; Girl Scouts; Auxiliary Polic~; 
Auxiliary Firemen; Schools (Material can be distributed at 
schools for children to take home. The Boston public schools 
insured delivery of the air raid alert cards by requiring 
the children to obtain a signed receipt from the parents and 
to return it to the schools); local newspapers (material can 
be tucked inside newspapers delivered to homes); local busi-
ness (material can be distributed at plants or enclosed with 
monthly bills or with other mailings). By such methods 
written information can be disseminated at no cost to the 
local civil defense organization. 
The evacuation zones are the key areas in the Mass-
chusetts civil defense system. They are the probable targets 
in an enemy attack; they are the heavily populated areas that 
will have to be totally abandoned in a hurry. The residents 
of these sections must be the best informed and best prepared 
of all. It is important that each person in an evacuation 
zone know every detail of the evacuation plan for his own com-
munity (and the community where he works, if it is not the 
same). Easily the most sound method of accomplishing this is 
to provide each family with a personal copy of the evacuation 
plan. Understandably, the state has not seen fit to have 
printed many separate evacuation plans and so has left this 
job to the local communities, although suggesting strongly 
that it be done. In the survey 12 of the 21 directors inter-
viewed were in communities falling within evacuation zones. 
As a measure of their creative activity they were asked: 




All six answering "yes" had also completed distribu-
tion of the evacuation plans. Of the six who had done nothing, 
one gave insufficient funds as the reason; the other five 
claimed that publication was unnecessary, that the Conelrad 
system would broadcast all required instructions and dirac-
tiona on evacuation. Such a view, however, leaves everything 
dependent on good communications before and during an attack, 
certainly a big risk to take. Experience in practice alerts 
has shown Conelrad to be ineffective in many suburban and 
rural areas due to interference and .fading; these "bugs" have 
not yet been weeded out. An evacuation plan, however, can 
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provide people with enough basic information about evacuation. 
beforehand to prepa.re them, at least partially. It also bas 
the advantage of supplying local, detailed information which 
Conelrad with its broader coverage, for reasons of time, 
cannot do. Besides, the value of Conelrad can be greatly 
enhanced if its use is restricted to giving out only current 
instructions and directions and not those of a basic nature 
which the evacuation plan would provide. 
One highly important civil defense function is natural 
disaster relief. The preliminary investigation revealed that 
promotional work in this area was being neglected. The direc-
tors were thu~ queried: 
j..yv 
Wi thA the past year have you released any information 






- Size of Community -
10,000 








Within the past year have you released any infonnation 
to the public by means other than through your local newspaper 







- Size of Community ; 
10,000 










The four director's giving a "yes" response to the 
first question were asked how many times within the past year 
they had issued press releases on the subject of natural dis-
aster. One said twice; the other three said once. As for 
content, all the releases concerned precautions recommended 
by civil defense to be taken in the event of a hurricane. 
The four affirmative respondents in the second question had 
distributed to the schools in their areas a comic book pub-
lished by the FCDA, entitled "Mr. Civil Defense Tells About 
Natural Disasters." 
Americans traditionally are inclined to treat lightly 
all preparations for defense, both military and civilian, 
until a crisis arises. Although since the Korean war public 
thinking on military manter-s1fu.asnchanged somewhat, it has not 
yet seriously touch~d upon problems of ho.me defense. The 
public seems to feel that since we are now at peace, unsteady 
as it may be, why worry - especially as we have never been 
attacked at home before. Such an attitude is archaic in an 
age of nuclear weapons and long-range jet bombers. 
In contrast to the comparatively remote danger of 
nuclear attack is the real and constant threat of natural dis-
astera * They occur often, with little restriction as to time 
and place. In Massachusetts, within a recent span of two 
years, there were two hurricanes, one flood, and one tornado -
not to mention several crippling blizzards. In these instances 
civil defense bodies were active in relief work. But despite 
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concrete experience in this field, civil defense organizations 
have failed to take advantage of this in their promotional 
work. It is important that civil defense public relations 
programs should emphasize the role of civil defense in natural 
disaster relief. When a promotional booklet, for example, 
talks about natural disaster, it is not talking about something 
thatmight happen, but about things that are happening all the 
time. People are far more likely to take notice of and take 
interest in realities than in possibilities, however important 
the latter may be. Of course actual experience is the best 
stimulant of all. When the Worcester tornado hit in 1953, 
the Worcester civil defense organization found itself short-
handed with just one telephone to handle all the communications 
during the disaster. As a result, the Worcester communications 
system is now the most complete in the whole state, superior 
even to that of the state agency. Civil defense bodies should 
concentrate on natural disaster relief work more than they 
are now doing, not only in their publicity, but also in every 
other phase of their public relations activities. 
B. Coverage 
There are many different ways of getting the civil 
defense messa ge to the public. As civil defense concerns 
everyone, any sort of communication is certain to reach some 
segment of the civil defense "public." Civil defense, because 
it is everyone's business, is singularly well-suited for 
communication through the mass media covering wide areas - the 
TV and radio stations and the large metropolitan dailies. 
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Unfortunately, however, Massachusetts civil defense has failed 
to take advantage of the ripe possibilities in this area. The 
state agency has been the most active of the organizations in 
releasing information to the metropolitan press. The larger 
cities have done relatively little outside of the 
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publicity connected with the annual nationwide alert, held in 
the summer, and National Civil Defense Week held every fall. 
Boston has not even gone that far, being content to let the 
state agency entirely handle the Boston press. In fact, at 
the time of this writing the Boston civil defense office, 
although authorized a paid PIO, had not had one for six months. 
In promotion by television and radio, civil defense 
in Massachusetts has fallen down badly. The state agency and 
the larger cities with TV and radio stations have done virtu-
ally nothing in this area. What television coverage there is 
in the state has been arranged by the federal government. The 
FCDA has distributed to all TV stations so requesting, a series 
of film recordings featuring Hollywood celebritie s for showing 
at will. - Also made available to stations were station-brea~ 
slides, props, spot announcements and other material. These 
are excellent public relations devices, but they need to be 
supplemented at the state and city level. What must be added 
is locally-oriented programs g eared to local interest. Phases 
intentionally generalized in order to appeal to a nationwide 
audience such as "Your civil defense needs volunteers," "Call 
Ci:Vil Defense," are hardly enough to stir up mor e than a very 
cursory interest in civil defense. Yet the MCDA and the city 
organizations have been satisfied with them for severa l years. 
To motivate people to serve or at least learn about civil 
defense, a program must extend into the i r own environments. 
People in the state want to know about civi l defense in 
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Massachusetts, and more specifically, in their own communities, • 
mot about the general state of civil defense in the nation. 
Before developing interest, and certainly before volunteering, 
they want to know specifics, not generalities. They want to 
knovr what civil defense has done in Massachusetts, and in 
their own community, what it is now doing, and what it hopes 
to do. They also want to know, specifically, what jobs they 
can do for civil defense and what civil defense can do for 
them. Of course people must first be convinced that the 
basic idea is important and sensible enough to warrant their 
time and support. Television offers a rare opportunity to 
demonstrate to the public just how civil defense operates 
during an emergency. Films or live telecasts showing the 
rescue, warden, police, fire, communications and other 
services working together in a mock disaster would add greatly 
to public knowledge of civil defense and likely stir up much 
enthusiasm for it. In April 1956 the New York City Civil 
Defense Agency in cooperation with NBC staged a live tele-
cast of a mock disaster operation on "Tonight," a late 
evening network show. The program had the rescue, fire and 
police teams combining to render aid and restore order to a 
"bomb-struck area." A program of this kind could give 
Massachusetts civil defense a tremendous boost in terms of 
public backing. One noteworthy feature of the New York 
program was the absence of words, excepting the brief 
accompanying narratives. Too often, and it is a mistake to 
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to be discreetly avoided, public service programs degenerate 
into long harangues by sponsoring officials who are so eager 
to snatch some personal publicity, they completely forget 
about the audience. And civil defense, by its very natnre, 
is best explained through action, not speeches, Although 
many communities are too small to have their own TV or radio 
station or to gain regular coverage through these media, this 
disadvantage is offset by the ease of reaching the bulk of 
the people. That is, it is no problem maintaining close 
personal contact with all civic leaders in such areas, as 
well as keeping abreast of all community activites. Irres-
pective of size, it seems logical that the first step for a 
community civil defense director in his public relations pro-
gram would be to call a meeting of all civic leaders, the 
political, business (including newspaper people), religious 
and social figures who shape the opinion of the community, 
At the meeting the director would present his views and 
plims, ask for opinions of those present and try to obtain 
their cooperation on the agreed-upon course of action. By 
this method civic leaders would be more inclined to actively 
support civil defense plans than if they had not been con-
sulted. As they would help to formulate the policy they 
would tend to feel responsible for promoting ci,ril defense 
in their own spheres of activity. Even those opposing the 
ultimate decisions would likely feel less hostile, as they 




an approach of this sort has not occurred to many of the 
directors, or if it bas, initiative has been lacking, as the 
responses to the following question indicate: 
Have you ever held a meeting wit h civic leaders in 
your community to discuss plans for civil defense? 
- Size of Community -
40,000 10,000 Under 
and over to 39,992 10,000 Totals 
Yes 3 3 1 7 
No 4 4 6 14 
It is surprising to note that directors in the smaller 
communities, despite the relative ease in bringing local 
leaders together, had the poorest record in holding meetings • 
Several of those answering "no" complained during the inter-
views that they had been having tremendous difficulty get-
ting civil defense appropriations approved. They had been 
appearing before town meetings and other legislative bodies, 
but, in general, had experienced little success. Results 
probably would have been better, had the directors met 
beforehand with legislative and other leaders to discuss 
civil defense plans and appropriations. A joint civil 
defense proposal of dominant community figures would carry 
considerable weight. 
As an added check on public relations coverage the 
directors were quizzed on their press and speaking activity: 
Within the past year how many press releases have 
you sent to your local newspaper? 
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- Size of Community 
40,000 10,000 Under 
and over to 39,999 10,000 Totals 
None 2 2 
1-3 2 5 4 11 
3-6 3 2 1 2 
Over 6 2 2 
Within the past year how many times have you or a 
member of your staff spoken on civil defense at a community 
function? 
- Size of Community -
40,000 10,000 Under 
and over to 39,999 10,000 Totals 
None 1 1 2 
1-3 1 3 2 6 
3-6 2 2 2 6 
Over 6 4 1 2 7 
The number of news releases sent out is, of course, 
not a complete measure of the extent and quality of a public 
relations program. The news release is merely one facet of 
publicity and publicity itself is just one phase of the 
overall program. Besides, there is no guarantee that a news-
paper will use a release, or that, if used, it will be read. 
Neverthe less, a news release is the simplest and least costly 
means of acquainting large numbers of people with civil 
defense, if not selling them on it. It can be generally 
assumed that the directors who make little/use of such a 
basic tool are not undertaking the more complex public 
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relations projects. The survey~oted one exception, however. 
As the above tables showJ the directors were more inclined to 
devote an afternoon or evening addressing a community group 
than to spend a few minutes writing a press release. Finding 
the answer to the seeming paradox required little probing. 
A majority of the directors attributed it to the facts that 
not much ever happens of news value in civil defense, but 
that one can always talk to a group of people on the subject 
of civil defense in general. 
c. Public Participation 
An intensive, continuing publicity campaign can do 
much to attract public attention and keep civil defense 
before the public eye. But attaining a high level of public 
support requires far more. For one thing, the public, when-
ever possible, must q.e encouraged to participate actively in 
civil defense affairs. This means that directors must both 
recruit volunteers to man all the civil defense services and 
also stage periodic events in which the general public can 
participate. 
In working out a plan of public participation a 
director should just try to enlist a nucleus of volunteers 
to assist him both in mustering others and in other projects~ 
Enrolling the initial few, unfortunately, seems to be a 
major obstacle. The warden, auxiliary fire and auxiliary 
police fonn the recognized core of a civil defense organiza-
tion, but in the 21 communities checked, the core was rather 
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soft and porous. The directors were asked: 
Have you started to organize an auxiliary fire 
service in your community? 
Yes, but service is not completely organized 19 
Yes, and service is completely organized 2 
Have you started to organize an auxiliary police 
service in your community? 
Yes, but service is not completely organized 17 
Yes, and service is completely organized 4 
Have you started to organize a warden service in your 
community? 
No 13 
Yes, but service is not completely organized 7 
Yes, and service is completely organized 1 
On the surface it would seem that the directors had 
spent far more time and effort organizing their auxiliary 
fire and police services than their warden services. The 
reason for the discrepancy lies with the responsibility for 
organization• Although the auxiliary fire and police are 
under the command of the civil defense director during an 
emergency, at all other times they are under the chiefs of 
fire and police only. And it is the fire and police depart-
ments which handle most of the recruiting. In contrast, 
organization of the warden service is entirely the director's 
job. 
With so lflew communi ties having their "key" services 
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at full strength, the "backbone" of our civil defense looks 
quite weak. The obvious questions at this point are why 
are these and other services so poorly manned and what can 
be done about it? As to why, one answer outshines all others: 
the direc·tors are not actively seeking volunteers. The 
directors were asked: 
Have you ever issued a mass appeal to the people of 
your community far civil defense volunteers? 
Yes 13 
No 8 
All those answering "yes" had issued an appeal through 
a. I :so 
their local newspaper. Seven had~ made personal requests 
through local businesses and social groups. Four had used 
their own organization, especially what wardens they had, 
to make personal appeals. All these methods have merit, but 
none is used often enough. Of those making mass appeals, 
none has ma.de them more than twice. Of all recruiting poli-
cies the pyramid method of getting what volunteers you have 
to contact their neighbors and friends appear to be the best, 
for it emphasizes the social element, something civil defense 
has too long neglected. One of the basic troubles with 
directors' enlistment policies has been their reliance on 
the appeal to either logic or patriotism, as exemplified . 
by the rather straight-laced filmed recordings of the FCDA 
shown nationally on Television. The point is that you can 
flood:.'< the country with millions of words about how sensible 
so 
civil defense is and how patriotic its volunteers are, but 
if people think they will not enjoy it, few of them will 
join, especially in peacetime. 
Once volunteers have been enlisted another serious 
problem arises - the problem of keeping them interested. 
One of the large city directors interviewed reported that 
his warden organization was formed shortly after ~passage 
of the state act in 1951, expanded to a point and then slowly 
disintegrated for want of anything to do. That, in part, is 
the difficulty. To recruit and maintain a fully-staffed, 
active civil defense organization the members must be given 
enough to do and they must be entertained. Speaking at a 
Region I FCDA conference in Harvard, Mass. in early 1957, 
Newton Mayor Howard Whitmore, Jr. favored injecting some 
fun into civil defense. To sell civil defense to the pub-
lic, Whitmore said, »we need adequate advertising and to 
place greater emphasis on the social activities along with 
civil defense. Your auxiliary firemen get tired of taking 
the same first aid course three and four times, your aux-
iliary policemen get tired of only doing a little traffic 
duty tw±ee a year, and what can wardens do?" 
The Ground Observer Corps is a good example of what 
the social element can do for civil defense. The FCDA in 
conjunction with the Air Force has required 144 observation 
posts in Massachusetts. By January 1956, 131 posts were 
organized, 118 of them active - 81.9 percent of the 
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required number. 23 were active on a 24 hour basis. All 
the figures are slightly higher at the time of this writing. 
Although the record is not what it could be, it still sur-
passes the record of local civil defense organizations by 
a huge margin. One reason is that the Ground Observer Corps 
gives its volunteers specific things to do - practicing 
identification of aircraft, plotting air routes on maps, 
handling communications apparatus and other duties. Another 
reason is the social benefits of the GOC. When it was 
pointed out to one director in the survey how much more sue-
cessful the Ground Observer Corps had been than the regular 
organizations in enrolling volunteers, he quickly answered, 
" Sure they can get the people. Young men and women can 
meet there - they really encourage women to join - and have 
a ball. They can putter around 1-d th binoculars, microphones, 
charts and maps, and when they tire of that they can sit 
around over a cup of coffee." Local directors should stress 
the social values of civil defense·both in their promotional 
work and in the actual operation of the various components 
of the organization. 
D. Timing 
Timing has beenr.,a rarely considered factor in the 
public relations activities of civil defense. About the 
only exception has been the publicity connected with the 
annual "Operation Alert" in the summer and the National Ci vi l 
Defens e Week in the fall. At the times of those e vents many 
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civil defense organizations engaged in some form of local 
publicity work to tie in with the national promotion. In 
1956 the alert took place in July, and civil defense week in 
September. From September until the present time, spring 
1957, civil defense promotion has been virtually dormant even 
though during this period there have been numerous happenings 
providing civil defense l.-rith excellent tie-in possibilities. 
Among them are: the outbreak of the Middle East crisis in 
November, 1956; Announcement that American jet bombers 
circled the globe in 45 hours in January 1957; Dallas Torna-
do in April 1957; and the freak blizzards in the Great Plains 
in April 1957. There were also many events of l esser promin-
ence which could have been tied-in with civil defense, as the 
15th anniversary of Pearl Harbor in December, 1956. Yet 
none of the twenty-one interviewed had taken any action to 
publicize their work at these tunes. Whenever big news 
events take place having a relation to civil defense, direc-
tors should exploit the opportunity to tie-in civil defense 
with what people are reacying, hearing and discussing. 
The importance of good timing is not limited to tie-
in publicity. Special events, such as Operation Alert and 
National Civil Defense Week should be held with careful 
regard for the calendar. Times should be settled so as not 
only to captare public attention and interest, but also so 
as not to inconvenience the public. Operation Alert, 1956, 
was staged throughout the country in July late one Friday 
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afternoon. It would have been almost impossible to pick a 
time when the roads were more congested in Massachusetts. 
Thousands of motorists were headed home from work. Many 
others were en route fo osummer resorts on Cape Cod, in New 
Hampshire or elsewhere to spend the weekend or start their 
annual vacations. Great numbers of out-of-state summer tour-
ists were on the roads. When the alert sounded, highway 
police everywhere stopped motorists and advised them not to 
move until the "all-clear" bad been signalled. As beneficial 
as the practice may have been to civil defense organizations, 
state and local officials frankly admitted the alert was an 
annoyance to the thousands of motorists already harassed by 
the ~e-weekend traffic congestion. Although the F.CDA set 
the time for the alert and the state was not to blame, still 
only the state can solve such problems by making it clear to 
federal officials that an ideal arrangement for one state may 
be poor for Massachusetts. As for an alert in t his state, 
for the reasons discussed a day in late spring or early fall, 
when the weather is generally good, at some time other than 
during ~ late-afternoon rush hour would be the moat sensible 
time. 
It may be argued that civil defense, by inconvenien-
cing people a little, may make them more aware of the 
greater inconveniences they may suffer in an enemy attack. 
However, as civil defense is still in the naelling" stage, 
it is not yet in a position to impose its will upon the 
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public without seriously damaging itself. 
As previously noted, in the past several years the 
two big nationwide civil defense events have been held in the 
summer and early fall. From September to the summer months 
has been a period of inactivity for civil defense promotion. 
Ideally, there should be some sort of nationwide or state-
wide public stimulant for the winter months. Regardless, 
local directors can do much to keep up interest during the 
interims. In addition to tie-ins with important news events, 
they can stage demonstrations and exhibits in conjunction 
with local mass functions, such as fairs and sports events. 
They canf seek cooperation of business concerns to set up dis-
plays in windows and places where people gather. For the 
truly ambitious director a local civil defense day or week 
\ is one good way of arousing public interest, winning its 
confidence and enlisting volunteers, all in one stroke. 
The factor of community pride would help here, as the com-
munity would be completely in charge, not just a branch-
office of a higher authority. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the public relations 
programs of civil defense at the local level in Massachusetts 
with emphasis on the handling of the problem of public 
apathy. We have pointed out the weaknesses and suggested 
some workable improvements. In the next two chapters we 
shall discuss further findings of the survey. Chapter VII 
deals with the state-local relationship, an integral part 
of the state civil defense machinery. Chapter VIII is 
devoted to a study of a major civil defense problem, the 




THE STATE-LOrrAL RELATIONSHIP 
According to the state organization plan, the chain 
of command in Massachusetts civil defense extends from the 
state director, Brigadier General John J. Maginnis, through 
each area director to each sector director to each local 
director. Technically, authority flows in the same direc-
tion, but in actual operation, it does not. The state 
director exercises full supervisory power over the area and 
sector directors who are full-time paid state employees 
~ppointed by the state director. The area and sector offi-
cers are field units of the state agency. The local direc-
tors, however, are directly responsible only to their own 
local g overnments. Those who are paid are paid by act of 
their local legislative body, not by the state. Thus, the 
line of responsibility is divided. What this means is a 
constant public relations job on the part of the ·state 
agency to keep the civil defense system well-integrated a nd 
smoothly-functioning. 
In appraising local programs it must never be for-
gotten that the bulk of the local directors are unpaid 
volunteers. We have stated this before, but in any s tudy 
of civil defense, it could hardly be mentioned too often. 
These volunteers are giving their time and efforts free of 
charge. Almost all have other permanent jobs. Most are 
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businessmen, some are police or fire officials. Regardless 
of their occupations, they must perform their civil defense 
duties during the evenings, Sundays or holidays. In view 
of the volunteer nature of their work and their sole respon-
stbility to their local governments, the local directors 
must be treated by the state agency not as just another 
group of state employees, but as individual leaders under 
state guidance. It is the function of the state agency to 
outline the policies and plans which will shape plann·ing at 
the local level. The state agency must assist and encour-
age local directors vJi thout either dictating or pampering. 
To test the effectiveness of the state agency's 
relations with the local units, the local directors were 
asked whether or not they thought the state agency was 
doing everything possible to help build local organizations. 
Six said they thought they were doing as much as they could; 
three had no opinion. The other eleven said the state agency 
was not doing all it could. The latter group was asked to 
list their objections and what the state agency should do 
about th~1. Ten of the eleven claimed the state agency was 
not telling them what to do with volunteers once they were 
enlisted. In general, they felt the state office, being 
composed of full-time, paid, technically-trained personnel 
should be sending out instructions on how to keep the 
members of their organization busy and interested. As one 
director commented, "The state agency keeps pestering us 
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local directors to organize wardens and other services, but 
never tells us specifically what to do with them once they 
are organized. I haven't got time to map out a detailed 
schedule for them and wouldn't lmow where to start if' I did." 
Of' the ten who raised the objection all but one said that 
the state agency should mail out more detailed written 
information on activities for civil def'ense workers. The 
other one brought up an excellent suggestion. He f'elt the 
state agency ought to dispatch skilled teams !'or each of 
the various services to all communities. The teams would 
rotate, spending perhaps a day in each community training 
people in various services, and demonstrating equipment to 
them. The sponsor of this idea thought the element of per-
sonal contact with skilled personnel would do much to inform 
and interest volunteers. It would also be a show of' good 
faith by the state agency that it is willing to spend the 
time and eff'ort to help develop local organizations. 
The survey uncovered one strong criticism of' the 
state agency which was certainly not expected at the start 
of the investigation. Seven of the directors expresse , 
resentment, in one way or another, to what they f'elt was a 
military-like operation of civil defense by the state agency. 
They referred, among other things, to the use of military 
titles by staff' and service officers (there is one Major 
General, !'our Colonels, two Lt. Colonels and one Lt. 
Commander among the top brass). They also objected to the 
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military nature of correspondence, the constant use of 
mill tary terms like "direct! ve," "technical bulletin, tt 
"mission,n "strategic," "tactical," and 11 command channels," 
-If!> 
anSA the use of military dates. Although to the impartial 
observer these seem like picayune objections, nevertheless 
they are points for the state agency to consider seriously. 
The attitude of the director who snapped, "The top man in 
the state is a general; I guess that makes us privates," 
cannot be overlooked. The gibes at the use of military 
titles and such, however, are only symptoms of the basic 
trouble. There is an undercurrent of feeling among some 
directors that the state agency comprises a group of people 
on the state payroll concerned only with making their own 
organization look good enough on paper with the eyes of high 
state officials to insure their soft jobs. The intimation 
that state officers are not sufficiently active or anxious 
# 
to make civil defense really succeed ts plainly not true. 
The staff officers of the agency are hard-working individu-
als unfortunately enmeshed in a frustrating maze of red tape 
and handicapped} due to a tight operating budget, by insuffi-
cient equipment and clerical help. They devote many hours -
of their free time to their work, including numerous eve-
nings delivering speeches. Unhappily, it is possible much 
of their effort has been misguided and their time misspent. 
.--
A. major portion of their time is consumed attending regional 
and state meetings, devising and re-devising state 
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organizational and operational plans, and handling required 
FCDA paper work. Meanwhile, the local organizations, the 
grass roots of civil defense, are left more or less to 
forage for themselves. 
Several of the directors complained that whenever 
the state agency has any promotional material to distribute 
it requires the local director to call for the material at 
either sector or state headquarters. One commented that it 
would be much more economical for the state to dispatch 
vehicles to deliver material than for each town to do it. 
He mentioned that he had to pick up some literature in his 
own car, as "no town department would adm.i t that it has a 
vehicle free to run errands for someone else." It is true 
that the state agency could accomplish distribution the most 
economically. But, even more important, any such move would 
show state support and interest in local affairs, an asset 
public-relations wise. 
About the only personal contact the local director 
has with the state agency is with the sector director at 
periodic meetings. As the sectors are blocked out geograph-
ically, and not functionally, they consist in many cases of 
a heterogenous group of communities. That is, a city with 
close to 100,000 population may be in the same sector with 
one having less than 10,000. The problems of the two are 
necessarily different. In addition, one may be in an evacu-
ation zone and the other in a reception zone. At some of 
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these meetings, topics must be extremely generalized to 
be on common ground. The directors from the communities 
with under 10,000 population, in particular, complain that 
these meetings do little for them, as the representatives 
from the larger towns consume too much time with talk of 
evacuation, handling of heavy equipment and the like, topics 
which do not directly concern them. City and rural problems, 
to simplify the difference, should be considered separately 
by separate groups. A realignment of areas along these 
lines, functionally, if not administratively, ts clearly 
in order. 
As we can see, the sta.te-local relationship is not 
as effective as it could be, and it is imperative that the 
state agency do something about it. The state agency must 
use its resources of manpower and equipment to lay a firm 
groundwork of mutual understanding and goodwill between 
itself and the local units. Ideas and information must be 
exchanged freely and often. The state agency must actively 
help to promote local organizations. This is not to say 
civil defense is a one-way street, that the state agency 
should always provide all the initiati¥e• But, by virtue 
of its position, it is best suited to provide the initial 
spark. It is tremendously important that the state agency 
immensely improve its local relations if everything is to 
function smoothly during an emergency. Without a prior pro-
gram of sound communications and cooperation there is danger 
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of a serious breakdown in operations during an enemy-caused 
or natural disaster. For example, local service units, such 
as fire, police, Red Cross, etc. might easily resent a rela-
tivelyUntested civil defense organization having supervisory 
and coordinative power over such well-trained and experienced 
operatives as themselves. Endless bickering, confusion and 
a general lack of cooperation would result. 
CHAPTER VIII 
WHAT IS CIVIL DEFENSE? 
The academic-sounding title of this chapter probably 
strikes the reader as a misfit at this stage of the study, 
for it is a question that should normally be handed at the 
beginning. However, at this point, we are not interested in 
a theoretical dissection of the ter.m ."civil defense," but, 
rather, in its practical application. Stated more simply, 
what does civil defense mean to us in actual operation? 
It was mentioned earlier that in the opinion of 
state and local directors and newspaper representatives the 
shelter-evacuation argument, next to general public apathy , 
is the factor most harmful to civil defense progress. 
Congressmen and members of the Executivacbranch are now, 
and have been for several years, squabbling over the civil 
defense program. The controversy has revolved around one 
main issue: whether evacuation or shelter is the best form 
of protection against enemy attack. To the impartial 
observer it would appear that this issue should have been 
settled back in 1951 when the present civil defense program 
first began. Seemingly, the federal government had committed 
itself to an evacuation policy, and now, suddenly, it has 
not. A switch at this time would mean millions of dollars 
' 
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and manhours wasted. Yet, the fact is that no final decision 
has been made on which plan will be used, and the indecision 
itself is taking a hes.vy toll in taxpayers 1 money, and, more 
important, in civil defense progress. 
In 195 6 the Nili tary Operations Subcomm:!.t tee of' the 
House Committee on Government Operations investigated the 
whole ciffil defense program. In hearings lasting almost a 
year, the body, called the Holifield Subcommittee, heard 211 
witnesses test~, in an effort to determine whether the 
evacuation or shelter plan should be adopted. The testimony 
weighed heavily in favor of the shelter plan. Scientific 
witnesses generally opposed the evacuation plan and empha~ 
sized shelter. They pointed out that there are definite 
limits to how much damage a nuclear bomb can do (e.g. one 
with 1000 times the explosive force of .the Hiroshima bomb 
will cause blast damage to an area only 10 times as large), 
that radioactivity is the greatest danger and the best pro-
tection against it is not flight, but cover. The scientists 
said that shelters, if built with thick walls, would afford 
good protection against blast, heat and radiation for those 
within just a few miles of the explosion point. Although 
representatives of the Navy Radiological Defense Laboratory 
placed the cost of building an adequate nationwide shelter 
program at the prohititive figure of $33 billion, a spokes-
man for the American Machine and Foundry Company estimated 
the cost at far less. Val Peterson, Federal Civil Defense 
Administrator, who has long regarded shelters as death 
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traps, said that a nationwide shelter program of any value 
woul d bankrupt us, but even he a_dmitted that fallout now made 
a combination of evacuation and shelter the most sensible 
15 
plan. In its final report, the subcommittee recommended 
that a mass shelter program be undertaken a.nd that civi l 
defense legislation be redrafted to place primary responsi-
bility with the federal government rather than the states. 
The immediate effect of the shelter-evacuation dis-
pute hBs been a restricted civil defense budget on the 
national and state level. Legislators have been reluctant 
to maintain, much less to increase, the current level oof 
expenditures as long as the civil defense program remains 
so clouded. Pressure has been exerted from many quarters. 
The Nation~l Chamber of Commerce, among the groups a ga i nst 
..... Ji I' 
. ~\ · -
· enlarging~ civil defense budget, in early 1957, selected 
civil defense as one of its major targets in its annual 
budget-slashing campaign. In its weekly newspaper, 
Washington Report, the group recommended a reduction in the 
proposed civil defense budget for fiscal 1958, stating: 
"While the Chamber supports Civil Defense as necessary to 
national security, it opposed any spending increases •until 
there has been a thorough re-examination by Congress' of 
16 
tba t agency's programs." In view of all the uncertainty 
15. Marine, Gene, Our Stupid Civil Defense, in ~ 
Nation, February 9, 1957. 
16. Washington Report, National Chamber of Commerce, 
March 1, 19~7, P• 1. 
surrounding civil defense, Congress has engineered drastic cuts in 
the civil defense budget for fiscal 1958. For example, the FCDA 
asked $75 million to buy reserve stocks of medical supplies, atomic 
and chemical warfare and defense equipment. This has been cut by 
$71.7 million. Massachusetts and many other states have refused 
to increase appreciably civil defense spending for the same reason. 
Budget-cutting has not been the only effect of the shelter-
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evacuation-argument. Probably the most serious is the adverse effect 
it has had recently on civil defense personnel. It has tended to 
confuse them and make them question t he value of going ahead with 
the present evacuation plans. The survey revealed that only 4 of the 
group of 5 state officials, 21 local directors, 10 newspapermen and 
5 r~di o and TV editors interviewed thought evavuation to be the best plan. 
All 4 were local directors. 7 favored shelter alone. 26 preferred a 
combination of shelter and evacuation - that is, where evacuation is not 
entirely feasible, shelter should be used. 4 of t ile respondents, all 
newspapermen, felt no plan yet devised is any good, as evacuation would 
be foolhardy and even a partial shelter program would be too costly. 
In general, all the newspapermen took a two-sided approach. 'Vhile 
approving of the work of the local directors in their own areas, they 
attacked, in varying de~rees, the plans and operations of civil defense as 
a whole. What editorial comment there has been in Massachusetts has 
robustly censured t he evacuation scheme. Probably t he most resounding 
editorial in recent years appeared in the Bost~m Traveler of October 16, 
1956. It noted the heavy traf fic congestion on New England highways over 
theColumbus Day holiday weekend, pointing out that 21 persons had died, 
and that there were UQ~erous traffic jams and rear-end collisions 
a ....-
throughout the region. The editorial further remarked th~~ although weather 
and driving conditions were excellent, confusion was t he rule. It concluded: 
Can you imagine what it would have be en 
like if these motorists were trying to get 
away from an impending air attack? Can you 
picture the panic and terror? And the, deaths, 
even if the attack proved to be a false alarm? 
Mass evacuation would mean mass suicide. 
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The editorial fairly well expresses the sentiment of 
most civil defense directors, and newspapermen and other 
opinion leaders. And, if such men as the directors, who 
have at least a superficial knowledge of civil defense 
pro blems, have little confidence in evacuation, it can 
hardly be expected that the general public, whom they serve, 
will place its trust in it. 
There are several glaring defects in the evacuation 
plan. The most obvious, of course, is the probably insur-
mountable traffic problem of evacuating thousands of panicky 
motorists over a limited number of routes. Also, effective 
evacuation depends on two shaky civil defense associations. 
One is that an evacuation zone will receive an advance warn-
ing at least one hour before attack. The other is that enemy 
bombs will drop on the probable targets and nowhere else. 
Should advance warning be given in less than an hour, and even 
an hour is hardly enough time to evacuate a city, or should 
enemy bombs be dropped outside the target areas, perhaps on 
prescribed evacuation routes, then mass evacuation would be 
nothing but a death march. 
When the various civil defense officials realize that 
evacuation is to be our salvation in the event of enemy 
attack, it is not difficult, f .rom one point of view, to 
68 
understand why their promotional efforts have been less than 
what they could be. Yet for saving lives an inferior plan is 
preferable to complete disorganization, and, besides, there 
is good reason to believe a new and better plan will soon be 
adopted as a result of the recent Congressional hearings. 
And, the sooner the public is educated and trained in basic 




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is clear in view of wha t must be accomplished if 
disaster strikes that the Massachusetts civil defense system 
is still in the embryo stage. The state and local organiza-
tions are mere skeletons of the bodies needed to meet an 
emergency. What there is of a civil defense leadership is 
steeped in the uncertainty of what course official policy 
will take next. And the vast resources of public relations, 
so vital to winning public interest and support and to estab-
lishing a sound working relationship between the organizations 
themselves, have barely been skimmed. 
In defense of state and local officials, it must be 
remembered that their path has been a rugged one. They have 
tried to establish organizations on tight budgets in the 
face of both an indifferent, peacetime public and a group of 
confused policy-making high government officials. 
Unfortunately, civil defense will probably not pro-
gress at the rate it should until the several policy problems 
are resolved at the federal level. As we pointed out earlier, 
the Holifield Subcommittee has recommended that a shelter plan 
be adopted and that primary responsibility for civil defense 
be transferred from the states to the federal government. The 
latter recommendation, if accepted, would mean more federal 
funds for the states. When these questions are finally 
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settled, civil de~ense will bene~it ~easurably. 
Should Congress accept the shelter plan, and in the 
light of the hostility toward evacuation, it seems likely 
that at least a combination plan is forthcoming, the state 
and local organizations will have not only a more sensible 
plan to work with, but ean=>help themselves tremendously 
public-relations wise. They should undertake extensive 
studies and devise plans ~or peacetime uses for shelters. 
In locating and constructing shelters, they should cooper-
ate with local of~icials in determining how these shelters 
can best serve the public in peacetime. One magazine edi-
torial, in urging that shelters be built for peacetime duty, 
suggested we use the shelters to alleviate traffic problems 
in our cities. It stated: "By turning proposed subterranean 
de~ense into peacetime traffic arteria, particularly ~or 
trucks and ~reight, we trans~orra what at ~irst glance looks 
17 
like a liability into an economic asset." In many cities 
there are acute parking problems. Underground shelters 
could serve in peacetime as public garages. There are other 
possible uses, but the main point is that the shelters should 
at all times serve the community, and not lie idle. It is 
certain that the public will regard civil defense in a more 
~avorable and realistic light if it ~eels that the personnel 
are not just star-gazing but are actually planning and 
17. American City Magazine, April 1957, p. 1. 
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constructing ways of helping the community on a full-time 
basis. 
In handling the problem of public apathy the state 
agency must take more initiative. First, it must, at the 
cost of staff reductions elsewhere, enlarge its one-man 
public relations staff in order to expand its own, state 
promotion efforts. More important, it must do everything 
possible to build up the neglected local organizations. 
Providing the local directors and their staffs with incentive 
is the basic step. In Congress, it has recently been sug-
gested that extra Federal Income Tax deductions be allowed 
civil defense workers, the amount depending on the hours 
worked. The state could make a similar provision in its 
income tax program, and some of the local governments in 
their property tax programs. However, state or local tax 
reductions appear unlikely without federal assistance. If 
the shelter plan goes into operation, tax allowances would 
be an excellent method of stimulating home shelter construc-
tion. Writing in Life, engineer Willard Bascom suggested 
that the federal government stimulate home shelter building 
by such methods as more favorable home financing, making 
low-cost shelter units available and granting property tax 
18 
benefits. He points out that the very least " ••• a social 
atmosphere must be created in which a person can provide a 
18. Bascom, Willard, The Difference Bet1-reen Victory and 
Defeat, Life, March 18, 19~7, p. 156. 
( 
shelter for his family without being regarded as an idiot 
or an alarmist by his neighbors.nl9 
There are means other than monetary available to 
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the state for motivating communities. The state could secure 
the cooperation of one or perhaps several coramunities of varying 
sizes, give them every possible bit of advice and assistance 
in building up their civil defense organization and then use 
these organizations as models for other communities to see. 
A solid, smoothly functioning organization is evidence to 
other communities that it can be done. Besides, if community 
pride means anything, many cities and towns will not allow 
communities of comparable size to have complete, well-integrated 
organizations in operation while theirs remain weak and motionless. 
The state a gency must try to maintain a close liaison 
between itself and the local directors. Representatives of 
the agency should maintain personal contact with the local units, 
by such methods as the one described earlier of sending teams 
to the local units on a rotating basis to inform, instruct and 
demonstrate equipment. The state a gency should keep local 
organizations constantly informed of all civil defense happenings . 
and make sure that at all times the chain of authority and 
responsibility is clearly defined. Otherwise, during times of 
crisis costly disputes might arise over who is to direct and 
who is to perform cert ain op~rations. It is most desirable 
that the state a gency instill a public rel ations consciousness 
in the local directors. It should give them advice in public 
19. Ibid. 
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relations policy and techniques. Almost all the local 
directors have had no public relations experience and regard 
the profession as publicity and nothing more. Some even feel 
that publicity consists wholly of news releases~ posters and 
pamphlets. They do not know~ for example~ how well suited 
civil defense is to television and how great would be the 
public relations value of a televised demonstration or mock 
operation. They do not realize that people are more concerned 
with what can likely happen to them and has happened before 
than with what might never happen. Thus, a promotional program 
on the civil defense role in natural disaster would have a 
strong tone of realism in it to supplement the program on 
nuclear defense. The state agency must also urge local 
directors to work closely with their community leaders~ to 
map out programs with them, and join them in making group 
decisions on civil defense. As noted in a previous chapter, 
a civil defense budget backed by civic leaders stands a far 
better chance of being approved then one submitted by the 
directors alone. In addition, if civic leaders participate 
in civil defense policy-making they are apt to back it with 
their own personal public relations campaign. 
In general the state agency should encourage local 
directors to conduct public relations programs so as to 
observe the principles of comprehensiveness, wide media 
coverage, active public participation and timing. It 
should urge them to remind the public constantly~ without 
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preaching fears that an enemy attack can occur but also urge 
them to explain to the public the practical limitations to 
the H-Bomb, that we can defend against it and that civil 
defense plans are the carefully worked out means of accomplishing 
the defense. 
Yet, no matter how much public enthusiasm and support 
is stirred up and how many volunteer workers are enrolled, 
there is still a problem left. If a local civil defense 
unit is to operate effectively, it must possess at least a 
nucleus of personnel able to devote a large part of their 
time to volunteer work. Most men can spend time only evenings, 
Sundays and holidays. :Hany women are available, however, 
and civil defense should concentrate on recruiting them. If 
women find time for the bridge club, the garden club and the 
music club they can just as easily find time for civil defense. 
The state agency has recently published a booklet entitled 
Hassachusetts Women I'n Civil Defense which lists the many 
duties women can perform. One job a woman can fill especially 
well is that of PIO. What is needed is an all-out drive to 
enlist women. The big selling point should be the social 
benefits, the chance to meet and mix with other women. 
In all its promotions civil defense officials should 
strongly emphasize the social element. They should encourage 
meetings, discussion groups, parties or any other way of 
bringing people together. Civil defense must be made to 
seem like fun, not toil. 
• 
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In summation, public relations can play a significant 
role in our civil .defense system by filling the huge breach 
between the civil defense organization and the people it 
serves. It can transform civil defense from a sluggish 
bureaucracy into a dynamic, forward-looking organization. 
l __ j 
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